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Zusammenfassung  
Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird der Versuch unternommen, internationale 
gouvernmentale Organisationen als lernfähige korporative Akteure zu betrachten. 
Damit soll gezeigt werden, dass internationale Organisationen weder als Instrumente 
mitgliedstaatlicher Interessen noch als Arenen multilateraler Verhandlungsprozesse 
hinreichend verstanden werden können. In der Perspektive des Organisationslernens 
wird danach gefragt, wie internationale Organisationen im Zuge des 
Interaktionsgeschehens mit Akteuren aus ihrem Umfeld über äußere Veränderungen 
und Trends lernen. Dabei geht es um die Vermittlung als auch die Interpretation der 
von außen an internationale Organisationen herangetragenen Erwartungen, 
Anforderungen, Ideen und Wissen. Ziel des Papiers ist die Entwicklung eines 
theoretischen Analyserahmens, der das Interaktionsgeschehen zwischen 
internationalen Organisationen und den ihre Umwelt repräsentierenden Akteuren als 
Auslöser für organisationale Lernprozesse begreift und gleichzeitig auch 
institutionelle, kulturelle und politisch-interessenbezogene Bedingungen 
berücksichtigt. Die aus dem Spannungsfeld zwischen Organisation und Umwelt 
resultierenden Lernprozesse sind dualer Natur: Erhöhte Anpassungsfähigkeit in den 
Grenzbereichen internationaler Organisationen geht mit Abpufferung des 
Organisationskerns von Umweltfluktuationen einher. Diese Einschätzung gründet auf 
der Prämisse der sozialen Konstituierung des Organisations-Umwelt Nexus und 
dessen Verbindungen mit organisationsinternen Prozessen. Darüber hinaus wird die 
politische Bedingtheit organisationaler Wissensprozessierung und der Einfluss 
administrativer Routinen und Verfahren auf die Aufnahmefähigkeit internationaler 
Organisationen betont. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article makes a case for viewing international governmental organizations (IOs) 
as corporate agents capable of learning. In doing so, it attempts to go beyond 
prevailing conceptions of IOs as means or settings for multilateral negotiation and 
bargaining. The proposed theoretical framework argues from an organizational 
learning perspective. By integrating notions from neo-institutionalism and policy-
analysis it tries to capture the impact of IOs' publicness on learning processes. The 
focus is on IOs' relations with stakeholders and constituencies for the development 
and implementation of transboundary policies. These interactions are seen as a 
means to learn about external demands, expectations and expertise. Their impact on 
the internal dynamics in IOs tends to be of a dual nature: enhanced adaptability in its 
margins and buffering the organizational core from environmental fluctuations. 
Hence, some skepticism is appropriate in assessing IOs' capacity to engage in 
profound changes as a result of learning. It rests on the contention that the social 
constitution of the organization-environment nexus and its linkages with intra-
organizational processes is of crucial importance for IOs' ability to learn about 
environmental changes and developments. Emphasis is placed on the contested and 
controversial nature of knowledge absorption and the limiting effect of administrative 
routines and procedures on IOs' absorptive capacity.  
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1. Globalization, international organizations, and learning1 
Against the backdrop of a globalizing economy there is a growing range of societal 
problems which cannot be addressed sufficiently at the national level. Due to their 
reduced problem solving capacity, national governments are challenged to become 
more intensively engaged in international cooperation, coordination and organization 
(Grande 1997; Messner 1998; Senarclens 2001). New forms of political governance 
are emerging at the transnational level (e.g. multi-level governance in Europe) and 
international intergovernmental organizations (IOs) become increasingly important for 
purposes of multilateral cooperation and negotiation. According to Senarclens (2001: 
512) states need IOs "to create the right conditions for peace and security, to 
promote international regimes, to carry out joint economic, social, cultural, ecological, 
or humanitarian projects, for knowledge-sharing and harmonizing their public policies, 
and for managing scientific and technical cooperation programs." They often serve as 
arenas in which argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion can take place – 
thereby contributing to the rise of a distinct type of social interaction in international 
affairs to be differentiated from strategic bargaining and rule-guided behavior 
(Morgenthau 1963: 411; Risse 2000).  
IOs play an important role in bringing new issues or problems on the agenda of 
international policy planning. But they are not sufficiently equipped with resources 
(personnel, finance, expertise, authority) to develop and implement transboundary 
policies on their own (Schmitter 1996; Weisband 2000). IOs' engagement in a great 
variety of communication and coordination relationships with actors from their 
environments involving national governments' representatives, experts they consult, 
private parties, NGO's etc. can be seen as a way to overcome these constraints. As 
a result, "IOs are deeply enmeshed with and dependent on their environments" 
(Haas 1990: 207). Moreover, as Gordenker and Saunders (1978) have argued, 
international organizations can rarely pursue their goals in a straightforward fashion 
under the administration of experts in the inertial and partly hostile environment of the 
state system. They must function with special sensitivity to their environments 
because they are urged to satisfy their clients and paymasters with appropriate 
programs. "The point is that these programs do not result from the exclusive exercise 
of technical rationality" (Haas 1990: 30). These processes are complicated by the 
                                            
1 I would like to thank Ariane Berthoin Antal, Mike Geppert, Dieter Plehwe and Holger Strassheim for 
their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
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frequent requirement in the administration of transnational policies to achieve 
coordination and collaboration of different governmental bodies which are operating 
in various institutional settings (Brown 2000: 583; Schmitter 1996: 145). As a result, 
the increased likelihood of competition or conflict between those bodies together with 
discussions directed by political ideology affect rationality in the development and 
execution of transnational policies (LaPalombara 2001: 560). 
All together, these external forces exert considerable pressure on international 
organizations to engage in learning (LaPalombara 2001). They exist and survive only 
because they manage to identify and please the demands and expectations 
emanating from national governments and private groups (Haas 1964; 1990; 
Rittberger 1995; Wiegand 1978). However, there is surprisingly little known on how 
these organizations identify “relevant” demands from external actors and 
accommodate or anticipate to changing environmental conditions. The question of 
what their bureaucracies will do when confronted with challenges emanating from a 
complex and dynamic environment puzzles not only observers but probably the 
agents of their international bureaucracies as well (Gordenker/Saunders 1978). The 
present paper aims to develop a theoretical framework to study how IOs cope with 
the challenges emanating from their environments. It incorporates the organizational 
learning (OL) perspective to highlight how, and under which conditions, "new 
knowledge" about external demands and trends is transformed into an organizational 
property (Huber 1991). The proposed framework is based on the premise that the 
social constitution of an organization affects its ability to learn from environmental 
actors about environmental developments (Child/Heavens 2001; Child 1997).  
The underlying idea of the paper relates to an important claim in theories of 
organizational learning that learning is triggered by processes of responding to 
changes in the external environment (Child/Heavens 2001; Dodgson 1993; Hedberg 
1981; Huber 1991; Klimecki/Thomae 1997). Hedberg (1981: 3-4), for instance, has 
pointed out that "organizational learning includes both the processes by which 
organizations adjust themselves defensively to reality and the processes by which 
knowledge is used offensively to improve the fits between organizations and their 
environments." It is argued that the various communication and coordination 
processes between international organizations and actors in their environment play 
an important role in becoming knowledgeable about developments in a given policy 
field. In this respect, organizational learning – or more specifically 'knowledge 
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acquisition' (Huber 1991) – is triggered through interaction and participation in social 
relations with environmental actors (Gherardi/Nicolini 2001). These linkages – 
captured under the term 'boundary spanning activities' – are conducive to the transfer 
of outside signals (expertise, demands, expectations) into the organization (Böhling 
2001). The same processes allow for the intrusion of outside signals that emanate 
from what is institutionally embedded in the social context of the organization, i.e., 
they bring society in (Granovetter 1985; Scott 1992). Understood as social 
interaction, the linkages of an organization with its environment can be more 
specifically qualified in terms of their behavioral quality and structuring (Tacke 1997).  
The transfer of outside signals into the context of an organization is not of a direct 
nature. Or as Dodgson (1993: 387) has put it, "organizational learning cannot be 
created and eradicated by varying external stimuli." Much depends on organizations' 
perceptual filters due to the fact that they "typically face much more information than 
they can sensibly process" (Hedberg 1981: 8). Processes of interpretation and 
sense-making are significant for an organization's capacity to cope with the 
complexities and dynamics of its environment (Dierkes 1988; 
Dierkes/Hähner/Berthoin Antal 1997). Theories of organizational learning pay 
particular attention to these cognitive aspects of organizing by emphasizing the 
communicational structure of organizations which creates for its members a mental 
box in which to think and to work (March/Simon 1958; March Olsen 1975; 
Weick/Ashford forthcoming). Moreover, processes of interpreting, distributing and 
using outside signals in the context of an organization reflect the political nature of 
organizational knowledge (Berthoin Antal/Böhling 1998). Drawing on these insights, it 
is suggested that organizational learning is an active rather than intuitive process 
highlighting the contested and controversial nature of knowledge absorption 
(Cohen/Levinthal 1990) and knowledge creation in organizations (Nonaka 1994; 
Nonaka/Toyama/Byosière 2001).  
Before these issues about organizational learning can be discussed in more detail, 
we need to broaden our understanding of international organizations to view them as 
corporate actors. The presentation of international organizations in institutional and 
legal terms leaves much out of interest. They are not merely instruments for the 
attainment of converging interests of their member states but also develop their own 
dynamics as agents within a transnational policy space that is expanding on the back 
of economic globalization. It is argued that the focus on IOs' capacity for agency and 
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the ensuing OL perspective is a useful starting point to open up the 'black box' of 
their organizational dynamics. Assuming that there is no freedom of discretion to IOs 
agents and that their bureaucracies merely mirror Max Weber's idealtype would 
probably just reproduce what we know already about public organizations' resistance 
to change (see LaPalombara 2001: 561). The application of the OL perspective to 
the organizational dynamics of international bureaucracies is an invitation to look at 
their capacity for agency in a demanding and complex environment. It promises fresh 
insights about IOs' dynamics in their roles as corporate actors in a transnational 
policy space. Conversely, theory-building in the OL discourse may benefit from the 
proposed analysis of learning in IOs due to the fact that the bulk of research in this 
field is based on firms (Berthoin Antal 1998: 45; Ventriss/Luke 1988: 349). 
 
2. Opening up the 'black box' 
Depending on how we think of international organizations, different approaches to 
the study of this type of organization become appropriate. Rittberger (1995: 25) has 
pointed out that IOs can be seen as (a) 'instruments' of member states' diplomacy, 
(b) 'arenas' for multilateral negotiations, or (c) 'corporate actors' assuming a third 
party role towards the member states; i.e., their behavior is not merely a reflex of 
member states' demands and expectations. The images of instrument and arena 
share assumptions from the intergovernmental approach assuming that member 
states use IOs to defend their interests (see Moravcsik 1995). Eising (2002) has 
summarized the core assumption of intergovernmentalism as follows: "Member-state 
actors form their preferences on the basis of domestic economic situations or in 
response to pressure from domestic interest groups. Agreements are then reached 
on the basis of bargaining power and mutual concession" (idem: 85). The important 
point is that perspectives arguing from this realm of thought do not attach an 
autonomous role to international organizations. The major players in international 
affairs are primarily national governments. Accordingly, IOs are either viewed as 
means or settings for political governance, but not as actors – the third image 
differentiated by Rittberger. Adherence to this image involves looking at their 
bureaucracies or secretariats in relation to the member states and constituencies. 
Rittberger has argued that an IO's function (e.g., policy planning, implementation, 
monitoring) and role (e.g., authority, decision-making competence) are critical 
components of its capacity for agency. 
 5  
Due to the fact that international organizations are always established by a 
multilateral international treaty, their purposes and objectives reflect common or 
converging national interests. IOs are political institutions shaped by member states. 
Looking at their embeddedness in political and institutionalized environments, there 
is much to say for IOs as instruments for strategic bargaining and arenas for rule-
guided behavior. Feld and Jordan (1994), for instance, stress that an IO's institutional 
framework is its most distinguishing feature. Variations occur from very simple, 
consisting of nothing more than a lightly staffed secretariat to very complex and 
comprehensive international bureaucracies with legislative, executive, and judicial 
competences similar to national governments. In this sense, the ways in which IOs 
cope with environmental changes cannot be described without reference to the 
underlying rules for social interaction. Both – their relations with actors who are 
formally outside the organization and the internal mode of working and organizing – 
are embedded in values, norms and regulations set by their members states. Their 
behavior reflects the rules and belief systems emanating from the broader context. 
Accordingly, the lessons learned through interaction with people from the outside are 
affected by the underlying rules for these coordination and communication activities. 
But political institutions are more than simple mirrors of social forces (March/Olsen 
1984: 739). This basic claim in neo-institutionalism stresses that processes external 
and internal to the corporate agents of political institutions affect the flow of policy 
planning and execution. The critical point is on how we understand the relationship 
between 'external' and 'internal'.  
From the enactment perspective, organizational environments cannot be separated 
from the process of organizing (Weick 1995). Though it is acknowledged that 
institutionalizations have a constraining impact on IOs' capacity for agency 
(DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Scott 1992), it is based on the premise that the ensuing 
conventions, norms and procedures are constructed and reconstructed in processes 
of social interaction (Geppert 2000; Majone 1989). In this sense, the density of 
institutionalizations in international affairs enables and constrains but does not 
determinate social interaction, for human agency creates, reproduces, and changes 
rules, norms, and values in the daily work of policy planning and implementing (see 
Giddens 1984; Risse 2000). The impact of 'external' performance criteria on 
international organizations may be discussed in a similar vein. External bodies are in 
a position to exert significant influence on IOs' scope for action because they impose 
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certain conditions for the organization to perform well. However, through participation 
in relationships with representatives of their member states, IOs' agents gain 
opportunities to influence the success criteria which external bodies may apply to 
them. An organization creates choice possibilities in a demanding and complex 
environment through the engagement in relationships that extend its external 
boundaries (Child 1997: 57). The same line of thought holds for an organization's 
ability to learn. According to Hedberg (1981: 13), for instance, it is "not only a function 
of the nature of the environment but also of their coping capacity, and of the 
dynamics that develop during the learning process." 
The relation of organizational agency to the environment is therefore dynamic in 
nature. From this stance, the environment has a constraining and enabling impact on 
organizational life. It presents threats to survive and opportunities to innovate. 
Accordingly, it is not meaningful to abstract from the environment when considering 
an organization's efforts to adapt to changing environmental conditions. External 
influences do not have a direct impact on organizational life. Organizational design 
and structure are not merely an outcome of environmental and other contingencies 
(Child 1972). The ways in which organizational actors understand their environment 
affect the perception of choice possibilities (Berthoin Antal/Dierkes/Helmers 1993; 
Friedberg 1995: 87 ff.). External influences become meaningful to an organization 
through interpreting them as being consequential for organizational action. They 
enter the organization through the filtering mechanisms of its external boundaries. An 
organization's perceptual filters are crucial for its capacity to buffer outside 
fluctuations and preserve its autonomy (Thompson 1967: 165). The conception of the 
organization-environment nexus as socially constituted acknowledges the enabling 
and constraining properties of the environment and the resultant balancing act 
between autonomy and dependence (Child 1997).  
Drawing on Lequesne (2000), it is argued that international organizations act 
somewhere between dependence and autonomy. On the one hand, IOs are created 
by and dependent on national governments. Moreover, they are obliged to act 
according to rules and procedures set up by their member states (e.g., treaties). 
These institutionalizations – whether formal or informal – serve to stabilize and 
control the interactions between the various actors involved in policy processes. They 
affect the distribution of resources which in turn affects IOs' power as political actors 
(see March/Olsen 1984: 739). Depending on the degree of financial and 
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administrative resources at their disposal, IOs are more or less autonomous. And 
depending on the issue at stake (high or low politics), national governments are more 
or less keen to use IOs for the facilitation of their interests and bargaining.  
On the other hand, international organizations enjoy a degree of autonomy from the 
national governments and other stakeholders in their environment. Senarclens (2001) 
has stressed the importance of external relations in this regard. International 
organizations "enjoy some autonomy in the performance of their mandate, all the 
more so when they can rely on the support of transnational political and social 
movements" (idem: 515). The mobilization of specific resources in the planning 
process of political programs brings their agency to the fore. IOs act as architects and 
brokers in the roundtable operations necessary for policy planning (Feld/Jordan 
1994). Moreover, they often serve as agenda setters by attending to new problems or 
introducing new perspectives on certain issues (Risse 2000: 20). The related 
organizational tasks consist in the management of cooperation, coordination, and the 
achievement of political compromises. Being the drafter of policy initiatives and 
programs with the possibility of synthesizing various inputs into one document is an 
additional significant resource in the hands of IOs' agents (Cram 1994; Laffan 1997; 
Lequesne 2000).  
IOs' agency refers primarily to their role as political actors and it is in this realm that 
they are assumed to display openness toward outside signals. Conversely, IOs' 
properties as public organizations present significant limitations for their capacity to 
learn. LaPalombara (2001), for instance, cautioned against a too-easy extrapolation 
of agency theory to the public sphere due to the very fact that their organizations are 
normative at their core. The prevalence of normative considerations in policy-making 
would be detrimental to rationality and efficiency. "Learning things about goal-setting 
or policy implementation that may be rational and efficient but that are palpably 
unfeasible politically is not only a waste of resources but also a one-way ticket to 
political bankruptcy" (idem: 558). Considering the recent changes in political 
governance at the national and supranational level in Europe, this trade-off between 
efficiency and rationality on the one side and political feasibility on the other may be 
questioned. In the European system of multi-level governance, for instance, the 
chances of policy adoption increase if they are politically feasible and well-informed 
(Kohler-Koch 1992: 101). Due to public policies' growing complexity traditional 
command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy become less effective 
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(Majone 1996: 616). The rising importance of policy-networks and the ensuing 
greater variety of actors involved in policy-making indicates a qualitative shift in 
political governance (Mayntz 1993). There is strong evidence in favor of ideas as an 
explanatory factor for policy-making that complements the supposedly independent 
role of institutions and interests (see Héritier 1993; Kissling-Näf/Knoepfel 1998; 
Klimecki/Lassleben/Riexinger-Li 1994). These factors do not replace but complement 
utility-maximizing and norm-guided behavior. Bringing in new ideas and perspectives 
is influenced by the underlying power relations. They define who has legitimate 
access to policy deliberation and may affect what counts as "good argument" (Risse 
2000: 15). These insights from policy-analysis form the basis for adhering to a 
political view on international organizations when conceptualizing internal learning 
processes.  
 
3. Modeling processes of organizational learning 
The identification of preference orderings, and the resolving of scientific uncertainty 
and strategic ambiguity present significant challenges to an international 
organization's 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen/Levinthal 1990). It is the underlying idea 
of this concept that "the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a 
function of the level of prior related knowledge" because such knowledge "confers an 
ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it" (idem: 
128). An organization's absorptive capacity consists in its ability to exploit outside 
sources of knowledge, i.e., its ability to interpret, store, and use it. As Kim (2001) has 
pointed out, merely exposing organizations to relevant external knowledge without 
exerting efforts to internalize it is insufficient. Cohen and Levinthal suggest that the 
effective transfer of external knowledge depends on the structure of communication 
between the organization and its environment, as well as among its subunits, and the 
character of distribution and expertise within the organization. 
Huber's (1991) differentiation between four constructs related to organizational 
learning is useful to explore an organization's absorptive capacity in more detail. 
Accordingly, organizational learning consists in processes of 'knowledge acquisition', 
'information distribution' and 'interpretation', and 'organizational memory'. Rather than 
indicating a linear phase model, Huber's constructs are used to attend to the four 
distinct moments that are seen as crucial to processes of organizational learning. By 
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doing so, it will be emphasized that "organizational learning is neither an effortless 
nor an automatic process" (Berthoin Antal/Lenhardt/Rosenbrock 2001: 865).  
First of all, 'knowledge acquisition' is the process by which an organization obtains 
knowledge from internal or external sources. An organization's units will acquire new 
knowledge if it is recognized as potentially useful to the organization. The acquisition 
of new knowledge is triggered by an organization's efforts to enhance adaptation and 
adaptability – particularly in fast changing and unpredictable environments. 
Knowledge may be acquired in a mindful and conscious way or it may be picked up 
tacitly (Weick/Ashford forthcoming). In the latter case it tends to be more complex, 
which makes it more difficult for the receiving organization to make sense of it. Huber 
noted that the unintentional and unsystematic way of knowledge acquisition is more 
frequent than the mindful way. However, as Child and Heavens (2001: 320) have 
pointed out, "even explicit knowledge is not necessarily imported with ease across an 
organization's boundaries." The transfer of outside signals across an organization's 
external boundaries merely opens up possibilities for the organization to adjust to 
changing environmental conditions. The question then is not whether intentional 
knowledge acquisition leads to more learning than unintentional (or vise versa), but 
how does either mode affect the other processes of organizational learning. Much 
depends on the ways in which new knowledge is communicated across the 
organization such as the setting where it is articulated or the value attached to it.  
The second construct relates to 'information distribution' as the process by which 
information from different sources is more widely diffused among the subunits of the 
organization. It relates to the breath of organizational learning. Huber asserts that 
more organizational learning occurs when new knowledge is made available to a 
greater variety of an organization's subunits and viewed as valuable. This 
quantitative approach to organizational learning is deepened out by the additional 
statement that "more organizational learning occurs when more and more varied 
interpretations are developed" (idem: 126). If a greater variety of meanings is given to 
new knowledge, the range of potential behaviors increases – albeit with the risk of 
being detrimental to the effectiveness of organized behavior. What matters here is 
the elaborateness of knowledge diffusion and sense-making.  
The diffusion of new knowledge is linked with  'information interpretation', which is the 
third construct. It highlights the development of shared understandings among 
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organizational members about distributed information. The development of more 
varied interpretations would probably increase an organization's centrifugal 
tendencies. The essence of information interpretation lies in the thoroughness of 
knowledge absorption according to Huber. The elaborateness of learning processes 
across an organization's subunits is a precursor to the thoroughness of learning. It 
concerns the uniformity of understandings across units regarding the possibly 
different meanings attached to new knowledge. Huber follows Daft and Weick (1984) 
in defining interpretation as "the process through which information is given meaning" 
(idem: 294), and also as "the process of translating events and developing shared 
understanding and conceptual schemes" (idem: 286). How information about 
changing environmental conditions is framed or labeled affects the value attached to 
it and in that sense if it is of any significance to organized action. Interpretations in 
organizations are socially constructed. The distinction between information 
distribution and interpretation is rather analytical in nature. Both activities occur 
intertwined in the reality of organizational life. The inter-subjective evaluation and 
sense-making of new knowledge is part and parcel of its diffusion. 
Finally, 'organizational memory' indicates the means by which knowledge is stored 
for future use. These include decision making processes, standard operating 
procedures and manuals, organizational structure and culture (Berthoin Antal 2000: 
34).2 It is about the mechanisms for individual learnings to become embedded in an 
organization's knowledge base. The impact of these mechanisms is complicated by 
the fact that a great deal of knowledge is tacit. Ways to surface this type of taken for 
granted knowledge are among others impeded by structural and cultural barriers in 
the organization (Berthoin Antal 2001). Beyond its impact on the storage and retrieval 
of new knowledge, organizational memory is of a fundamental nature. To some 
extent processes of knowledge acquisition, distribution and interpretation are directed 
by previous learnings, criteria used in decision making, and frames of reference. In 
that sense it is similar to Cohen and Levinthal's concept of 'prior related knowledge' 
which highlights the impact of existing knowledge on the assimilation of new sources 
of knowledge. In his conceptualization of organizational learning as adaptation, 
Shrivastava (1983: 10) has also pointed out that it is a function of an "organization's 
experience with the knowledge base that underlies decision processes." It is for 
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these reasons that organizations tend to learn what they know already. Path 
dependence is an important feature of organizational learning, i.e., new sources of 
information become relevant knowledge to an organization if they are compatible with 
the dominant beliefs and practices. Knowledge acquisition operates in the service of 
these beliefs and practices (Weick/Ashford forthcoming). The adherence to visions 
where the feasible and the thinkable are brought together is of some value to 
overcome this conservatism (Dierkes/Marz 1998). Moreover, the blurring of an 
organization's external boundaries is another factor that challenges an organization's 
dominant beliefs and understandings, though with the inherent risk of information 
overload (Wiesenthal 1995).  
 
4. Towards a model of learning in international organizations 
The engagement in relationships with external partners is significant for international 
organizations to survive. The various coordination and communication activities with 
actors from the outside are necessary for the development and implementation of 
transboundary policies. Along with this functional need, the interaction with external 
partners presents also opportunities to innovate. Haas (2000), for instance, showed 
that the transmission of information from outside sources is the most common 
process by which learning occurs in international organizations. Brown (2000) has 
pointed out that uncertainty in policy-related aspects makes policymakers in the 
European Union more willing to seek out and accept information from within and 
outside the organization including those provided by epistemic communities (see 
Haas 1992). "Scientific uncertainty may exert greater impact on the policy process 
than direct lobbying" (Brown 2000: 578). Moreover, Schmitter (1996) and Weisband 
(2000) have observed severe implementation difficulties regarding transnational 
programs (e.g., supervisory system of the ILO). The diversity of the 'policy space' and 
the lack of resources to monitor and to assure the compliance with IOs' programs are 
among others important reasons for international organizations' increased sensitivity 
to their environments. Depending on their openness to outside signals, 
implementation difficulties create compelling sources for information and feedback on 
how well they are doing.  
                                                                                                                                        
2 See also Weick's and Ashford's (1996) conceptualization of organizational culture and its impact on 
learning processes: "It acts as a symbol and storage of past learning, and it works as an instrument to 
communicate this learning throughout the organization" (idem: 5). 
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IOs' relationships with the external environment present considerable pressure to 
engage in organizational learning. Their relatively blurred boundaries towards the 
environment (Haas 1990; 1964) make them particularly well-suited to study how 
interactions with environmental actors trigger learning. The proposed theoretical 
framework is based on the premise that the ways in which openness to outside 
signals is achieved affects the establishment of processes whereby that knowledge is 
used in the context of the organization (Child 1997).  
"These social networks facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and other resources by organizations 
and the offering back of desirable goods to the outside world. The same networks also permit 
exchanges of information relevant to the formulation of goals for organizational development and 
learning. The plurality of these networks … adds grist to the mill of internal political debate and 
negotiation." (idem: 68-9) 
In that sense, it follows the notion of Crozier and Friedberg (1979: 94) to analyze the 
organization-environment nexus – i.e., boundary spanning activities – in relation to its 
linkages with intra-organizational processes. Huber's model of organizational learning 
forms the basis for such a comprehensive approach. By discussing the role of 
boundary spanning activities in each step of his model, factors hindering and 
promoting learning from interactions with outside partners will be delineated. The 
framework revolves around the duality of boundary spanning activities for 
organizational learning (Böhling 2001). A closer look at international organizations' 
interaction with outside partners is therefore useful to analyze (a) whether these 
contacts are used as a chance to adjust and innovate or (b) whether transferred 
impulses are perceived as disturbances to organizational routines and procedures. 
Because of IOs' properties as international bureaucracies with blurred external 
boundaries, both options are thinkable. The intensity of contacts with outside 
partners makes them vulnerable to demands, expectations and expertise. 
Simultaneously, the bureaucratic mode of working and organizing presents 
blockages to knowledge absorption and internalization. 
 
4.1 Knowledge acquisition through boundary spanning activities  
The role of boundary spanning activities is most obvious in processes of knowledge 
acquisition. Child and Heavens (2001: 320) have more recently pointed out that 
“boundary spanners, who work at the interface between their firm and its external 
environment, play a critical role in the process of transferring information into an 
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organization.” Huber (1991) discusses the contribution of boundary spanning 
personnel to organizational learning under the heading of environment scanning. 
Among other mechanisms, boundary spanners act as sensors of the organization's 
environment and thereby contribute to an organization's performance monitoring. As 
a result of their external relations, boundary-spanners are able to asses how well the 
organization is meeting both their own standards and the expectations of external 
constituencies and stakeholders. Moreover, these contacts open up possibilities to 
influence which issues are being emphasized when external bodies evaluate how 
well the organization is doing. 
The ideas associated with boundary spanning activities can be traced back to 
Thompson (1962; 1967) and Aldrich (1979). They have coined the terms 'boundary 
spanning units and roles'. While the first term refers to particular structural 
arrangements situated at an organization’s external boundaries, the term boundary 
spanning roles indicates a certain work role which is necessary to engage in social 
networks that extend an organization’s boundaries. Together, they constitute 
'boundary spanning activities'. Boundary spanning units have a dual function for 
organizations. They contribute to organizational adaptation by importing new 
developments into the organization and they protect the core from information 
overload through buffering. "Organizations … seek to isolate their technical core from 
environmental influences by establishing boundary-spanning units to buffer or level 
environmental fluctuations" (Thompson 1967: 165). Aldrich’s (1979) view on 
boundary spanning units is similar in scope, but he puts greater emphasis on 
boundary spanning units’ contribution to organizational adaptation. 
"They are the points of contact with the environment for information monitoring and intelligence 
gathering, and because they absorb uncertainty they protect the core of an organization from 
information overload … by importing new developments into an organization they make possible its 
continued renewal and adjustments to changing environmental conditions." (Aldrich 1979: 251) 
Boundary spanning units embody certain perceptual filters that "enable some things 
to be seen more clearly by blending out others" (Berthoin Antal et al. 2001: 868; 
Crozier/Friedberg 1979: 101; Dierkes 1988). These selective mechanisms are crucial 
for the functional duality of boundary spanning units to occur. They play an important 
role for an organization’s agency in a dynamic and heterogeneous environment 
because they contribute both to the identification of relevant external changes (for 
adaptation) and the buffering of external disturbances (for uncertainty absorption). 
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The duality of boundary spanning units means for organizational learning that it can 
be preservative as well as innovative (Weick/Ashford forthcoming). This connection 
highlights a basic tenet in theories of organizational learning that learning occurs 
when people reaffirm frames of reference as well as when they change them, i.e., 
single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris/Schön 1978). 
Through emphasizing ‘activities’ the interactions between organizational members 
and external partners are highlighted. This accentuation points to the process of 
conducting relationships with people who are formally outside the organization. The 
interactive element of boundary spanning activities is seen as a form of enactment 
(Weick 1995) in the sense that opportunities and constraints in accommodating to 
changing environmental conditions are socially constructed through various intra- and 
inter-organizational interactions. At a more basic level, it attends to a sociological 
stance in the OL discourse – as formulated by Gherardi and Nicolini (2001) – that 
social relations are important for the transmission of knowledge and that learning is 
always situated in the sphere of social interaction (see Nonaka/Toyama/Byosiére 
2001). Following from that, boundary spanning activities are conceived as a social 
practice which triggers organizational learning. As a variation on Hedberg's (1981: 4) 
assertion that "acting is the mean to acquire knowledge", it is argued here that 
boundary spanning activities are a means to acquire knowledge about changing 
conditions and developments in the environment. They are situated at an 
organization's external boundaries. Since this organizational context for learning is 
characterized by multiple realities and a combination of shared and unshared 
meanings (Weick/Ashford forthcoming: 16), processes of interpreting the acquired 
knowledge are essential for effective learning.  
Boundary spanning activities illustrate the blurring of an organization's external 
boundaries (Böhling 2001). The establishment of relations that extend an 
organization's boundaries raises doubts about how externalized the environment 
really is from its constituent organization. Theories of organizational learning suggest 
that the blurring of external boundaries would make organizations particularly 
responsive to changing demands and conditions in their environment (Hedberg 1981; 
Huber 1991; Klimecki/Thomae 1997). Learning is triggered by the process of 
responding to changes in the external environment. The important note is that these 
processes are not of a direct nature. The acquisition of new knowledge due to 
boundary spanning activities is mediated by factors inherent to the social constitution 
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of the organization-environment nexus. Blurred boundaries cannot be equated with 
learning since "the permeability of those boundaries and the provisions for 
transferring information across them are consequential for organizational learning" 
(Child/Heavens 2001: 320). Wiesenthal (1995) has pointed out that an unconstrained 
transfer of outside signals into the organization may result in information overload. 
This in turn leads to a higher degree of uncertainty which is detrimental to an 
organization's capacity for agency. Tacke (1997) has argued in a similar fashion. The 
impact of blurred boundaries for organizational learning is ambiguous. Though 
blurred boundaries may enhance an organization's capacity to learn about 
environmental developments, they also present threats to the stability of the system 
due to a greater load of potentially contradictory information. Because information 
overload detracts from effective interpretation (Huber 1991: 146), it may hinder 
instead of fostering learning processes. 
The shaping of an organization's external boundaries is therefore crucial for an 
understanding under which conditions an organization learns from environmental 
actors about environmental developments and changes. The interaction of 
organizational members with external partners through boundary spanning activities 
is organized and regulated, linked with intra-organizational processes, and exhibits 
characteristics of mutuality (Crozier/Friedberg 1979: 94). Boundary spanning 
activities are more or less formalized, serve specific goals, embody particular rights 
and obligations, and certain underlying orientations guide actors' behavior together 
with institutionalizations in terms of rules and 'taken for granted assumptions'. The 
structuring of boundary spanning activities gives rise to a certain quality in the 
ensuing interactions. A setting which allows the articulation of diverse understandings 
is conducive to organizational learning because it offers opportunities to the 
organization to adjust its 'beliefs about reality' (March 1991).  
Risse (2000) has shown that nonhierarchical and network like international 
institutions provide the structural conditions for discursive and argumentative 
processes. The emphasis on communicative action between IOs' agents and their 
external partners rests on the assumption that those involved in multilateral 
negotiations do not hold fixed preferences and interests but are open to deliberation 
and persuasion (idem: 33). A distinctive feature of interactions within these social 
networks is the collision of a variety of interests, perspectives, and arguments that do 
not necessarily fit into one frame of reference. A certain openness towards other 
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understandings and a willingness to incorporate those into ones own thinking are 
important prerequisites for the occurrence of communication and negotiation in the 
context of boundary spanning activities (Weyer 2000: 27).  
Findings from policy studies in the European Union substantiate Risse's judgment. In 
the European system of multi-level governance one can observe two types of 
interaction patterns. Strategic bargaining is complemented by the emergence of an 
interaction pattern that is more strongly oriented towards problem-solving and 
deliberation (Mayntz 1993). Both are differentiated in terms of underlying orientations. 
Whereas a selfish exchange-logic is guiding the bargaining mode, argumentation and 
persuasion are more prevalent in the second mode. There are striking parallels 
between the interaction pattern oriented towards problem-solving and the bridging 
strategy which is discussed in the context of organizations' efforts to gain greater 
control over their environment (e.g. Neergaard 1998). With bridging, organizational 
members try to stabilize environmental and other operational contingencies through 
various forms of reciprocity with external actors, i.e., negotiation, co-operation, and 
exchange of information. Following from that, it is concluded that the problem-
solving/bridging pattern is more conducive to organizational learning than the 
bargaining mode because it allows a greater variety of perspectives and ideas to be 
communicated. However, one needs to take a closer look at internal processes of 
knowledge absorption to assess whether these perspectives and ideas are 
transformed into organizational knowledge. 
 
4.2 Knowledge absorption beyond information-processing 
Boundary spanning activities reflect an organization's dependence on external bodies 
for its survival and development. It is probably reasonable to assert a positive 
correlation between engagement in external relationships and dependence on 
environmental contingencies. Moreover, as Crozier and Friedberg (1979: 95) have 
noted, the engagement in external relations present significant power resources to 
the actors involved – all the more so if organizations rely heavily on outside partners 
for their agency as is the case with international organizations. Following from this, it 
is assumed that boundary spanning activities are entangled with power relations and 
that this affects the lessons learned through interaction with outside partners. 
Gordenker and Saunders (1978: 87) have argued in a similar fashion by suggesting 
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that considerable power "accrues to those who can extract facts from the 
environment, promulgate ideas which can serve as a basis for coherent planning, 
and 'absorb uncertainty' by selectively paring away the world's native complexity."  
Taking the dynamics of power relations into account when studying an organization's 
absorptive capacity builds on a growing field in the OL discourse. Processes of 
knowledge absorption and internalization are political (Berthoin Antal/Böhling 1998: 
232). Czarniawska-Joerges (1996: 3974), for instance, has pointed out that 
"negotiations in an effort to make common sense … would prove unrealistic if all 
were to negotiate with all. Leaders are given a special prerogative: that of organizing 
the organizing" (see Filion/Rudolph 1999). Child and Heavens (2001: 322) have 
noted that "the significance of information for organizational learning is not what it 
literally says but also where it comes from and how its social implications are 
interpreted." Knowledge has a contextual nature. Based on these grounds, they have 
criticized the prevalence of information-processing in theories of organizational 
learning. The perspective of organizations as information-processing systems is 
entangled with a tendency to view knowledge as an objective, transferable good to 
the neglect of symbolic connotations attached to it.  
Nonaka, Toyama and Byosière (2001; see Nonaka 1994) approach the underlying 
view of organizations as information-processing systems in the OL discourse also 
with some skepticism, but they come from a different angle. Organizations do not just 
process information obtained from internal or outside sources in order to solve 
defined problems in accordance with a given goal, but create new knowledge through 
interaction, cooperation, and communication. In the 'theory of organizational 
knowledge creation' knowledge is viewed as a dynamic asset, "for it is dynamically 
created in social interactions between individuals both within and across 
organizations" (Nonaka et al. 2001: 493). A clear distinction between the terms 
'information' and 'knowledge' is drawn to highlight that knowledge is created by the 
flow of information in organizations and that this development constitutes learning. 
These insights help to overcome the somewhat artificial distinction between individual 
and organizational learning and the ensuing transformation from individual into 
organizational knowledge (see Wilkesmann 1999: 47). Emphasis is placed on social 
interaction as a central driving force behind learning processes. Moreover, they give 
credence to think of organizations as dynamic and active entities that cope with 
changes in their environments and change themselves through learning. However, 
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the underlying enthusiasm for organizational knowledge creation as "a never-ending 
process that upgrades itself continuously" (idem: 498) fails to take account of factors 
inherent to the social constitution of organizations that impinge upon learning 
processes. Processes of knowledge creation are analyzed to the neglect of debate 
and negotiation as constituent elements of sense-making. Moreover, barriers to 
learning emanating from an organization's structure, culture, and leadership are not 
addressed (Berthoin Antal/Lenhardt/Rosenbrock 2001). 
When looking at international organizations who are assumed to learn primarily in 
their role as political actors, the impact of power relations on learning processes 
cannot be ignored. Debate and negotiation are seen as integral aspects of 
knowledge distribution and interpretation. The adoption of new beliefs and facts 
about reality calls for a change in or at least a reconsideration of an organization's 
behavior towards its environment. It may also challenge an organization's internal 
status quo. The politics of organizational knowledge become a pressing issue since 
"key members of the organization have a stake in maintaining the structures and 
power relations that are advantageous to them" (Berthoin Antal et al. 2001: 866). 
This holds also for those members of the organization who are involved in boundary 
spanning activities. They are assumed to exert control on the flow of information 
emanating from interactions with outside partners. They affect what type of 
knowledge may be expected from boundary spanning activities through the definition 
of experts that are involved for instance; i.e., they influence the search direction for 
environmental scanning. Moreover, to some extent they can influence which actors 
and subunits in the organization gain access to these newly acquired sources of 
knowledge and the value attached to them; i.e., boundary spanners influence 
whether acquired knowledge makes its way to decision-making in the upper echelons 
of the organization. It is therefore reasonable to assert that boundary spanners may 
pursue certain interests when they search for and distribute the ideas and 
perspectives gained from interaction with outside partners. 
However, studying organizational learning solely in terms of organizational politics to 
the exclusion of other factors would be misleading. The attainment of interests is 
embedded in certain worldviews or belief systems. The discussion about the 
relationship between ideas and interests in the growing field of policy analysis which 
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follows the 'argumentative turn' is illuminating in this regard (Fischer/Forrester 1993).3 
It is argued that the rational and the political are not antithetical and mutually 
threatening. Instead, paradigms or perspectives and visions on policy problems 
convey certain interests since "one's interests are shaped by one's experiences" 
(Haas 1990: 2). Rather than stressing a trade-off between ideas and interests as 
explanatory factors for policy change, it is at the center of this more recent strand in 
policy-analysis to identify the conditions under which certain ideas or perspectives 
serve the attainment of certain interests (Conzelmann 2002). Policy changes are then 
explained in terms of a paradigm shift and with reference to the underlying social 
rules. The central argument of this discussion may be summarized as follows:  
"We often act both strategically and discursively – that is, we use arguments to convince somebody 
else that our demands are justified – and by doing so we follow norms enabling our interaction in the 
first place ... The real issue then is not whether power relations are absent in a discourse, but to what 
extent they can explain the argumentative outcome" (Risse 2000: 18). 
The conceptualization of interests and ideas as intertwined factors in policy-making 
reminds the organizational learning scholar that the articulation of good arguments 
and appropriate perspectives in processes of knowledge distribution and 
interpretation is a function of one's values and interests. Referring to outside partners 
in these processes may enhance one's capacity of being heard in the context of the 
organization, but it also increases the likelihood of internal debate and negotiation. 
The chances of internal adoption rise if the boundary spanners involved succeed in 
framing the newly acquired knowledge within overarching political visions or 
consensual perspectives (Böhling 2001). It is in this sense that boundary spanners 
serve as perceptual filters. Established perspectives and beliefs guide to some extent 
whether external arguments and demands are considered relevant knowledge for 
policy planning and execution. At a more general level, these insights point to the 
discretionary content in such institutionally staged performances of international 
organizations. At an IO's external boundaries policy-relevant issues tend to be 
                                            
3 Majone (1989; 1996) was one of the first authors who stressed deliberative elements in policy-
making. He suggested that "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms 
power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument" (Majone 1989: 2). The 
focus on argumentation in the study of policy-making and planning has paved the way for an 
alternative approach to the dominance of rational choice and game theory in policy analysis. It opens 
the way for a critical examination of problem construction, reconstruction, and its underlying dynamics 
of rhetoric's and interpretation. In that sense it is similar to Gherardi's and Nicolini's (2001) 
'metaphorical conception of organizational learning' that allows us to recognize the relationship 
between organizing and the social and cognitive processing of knowledge, and between 
organizational action and thought. 
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represented in many languages, discourses, and frames of reference. This calls for 
deliberative efforts of the actors involved which in turn allows for some discretion 
within the boundaries set by the member states. The relationship between 
institutional constraints and actor's behavior in international affairs may therefore be 
viewed as dynamic in nature. Majone (1989: 96), for instance, has emphasized that 
"policy actors are not artificially separated from the process that sets constraints on 
their behavior. The same people pursue their goals within the given institutional 
framework and attempt to modify that framework in their favor."  
Along with the impact of power relations on knowledge distribution and interpretation 
there is also much that depends on the ways in which internal organizational barriers 
are bridged during process of knowledge distribution and interpretation. An 
organization's structure and culture may present significant barriers to processes of 
organizational learning. They constitute an organization's memory and affect the 
ways by which new knowledge becomes part of the collective knowledge base. 
Berthoin Antal et al. (2001) remind us to think of OL relevant issues in an 
organization's structure, culture and leadership as interrelated rather than as distinct 
and independent elements. Hedberg (1981), for instance, has suggested that 
organizations can enhance their information-processing capacities through 
decentralization and participative management, provision of resources, and the 
development of rewards and incentives for sharing knowledge. As a result of 
specialization, differentiation, and departmentalization organizations do not know 
what they know (Huber 1991). Organizational knowledge grows differentially across 
functional, departmental, and hierarchical boundaries (Shrivastava 1983). Moreover, 
an organization's hierarchies and the ensuing distribution of resources and 
opportunities exert a significant influence on interpreting new ideas and facts about 
reality. The power to define reality is affected by one's position in the hierarchy 
(Weick/Ashford forthcoming). This definition power is maintained by an organization's 
procedures and regulations. 
An organization's procedures and regulations reflect its structure and embody its 
underlying socio-cultural norms (e.g., incentives and punishments for bringing in new 
ideas). They determine which member will be privy to what kind of information. 
Shrivastava (1983) has pointed out that bureaucracies have elaborate systems of 
procedure and regulations to control the flow of information among organizational 
members. "These rules guide exactly which information goes to whom and for what 
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purposes … there is little concern for organizational members sharing their 
perspectives or frames of reference with each other" (idem: 23). Accordingly, one 
may expect substantial limitations to the emergence of debate and discussion across 
the internal boundaries of international bureaucracies. These structural barriers lead 
to difficulties in understanding each other's terminology, metaphors, or stories 
(Berthoin Antal et al. 2001). IOs are far from being monolithic cultures and 
mechanisms to bridge internal barriers are probably hard to find. The structural 
differentiation is complemented by the frequent existence of multiple realities and a 
combination of shared and unshared beliefs – an effect that is enhanced by IOs' 
blurred external boundaries (see Wiesenthal 1995: 151). If people hold different 
perspectives, they learn different lessons from the same data (Weick/Ashford 
forthcoming). Moreover, if the communicational structure of the organization is 
flavored by a 'not-invented-here syndrome' among its various subunits, the likelihood 
of cross-departmental knowledge sharing and sense-making is severely limited. 
Beyond that a differentiation between policy making and implementation is helpful to 
assess an IO's capacity to learn from boundary spanning activities. During processes 
of policy implementation adherence to rule-guided behavior is assumed to be greater 
than in policy making. When it comes to the execution of transnational policies, IOs 
are more clearly bound to legislature and one may expect a lower degree of 
discretionary content than is the case with policy development and planning. If 
programs are fixed and if their execution is mainly guided by standard operating 
procedures, there is not much that boundary spanners may change about it through 
the contribution of policy-relevant knowledge. Stated differently, in an organizational 
climate that is dominated by thinking formatted in procedures and regulations new 
perspectives and ideas tend to be equated with unwelcome disturbances to the 
normal routines. However, the implementation of policies is not an automatic 
process. The top-down approach which assumes a dichotomy between specified 
program goals (politics) and mechanisms to ensure implementation (administration) 
is untenable empirically (Palumbo/Calista 1990: 14). Lang (2000), for instance, has 
argued that the agents in implementing bodies do not simply adhere to the 
prescribed limits of political measures but make use of the discretionary content in 
their work role to adjust transboundary policies to the local demands and 
expectations. It may therefore be concluded that the capacity of IOs' agents in using 
discretion is of crucial importance for the extent to which policy-relevant knowledge is 
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incorporated during processes of implementation. In this sense, the constraining and 
enabling impact of rules and procedures on knowledge absorption is acknowledged 
(see Kieser/Beck/Taino 2001; Risse 2000). 
The development and planning of policies in the institutionally staged performances 
of international organizations is assumed to allow for a greater degree of discretion 
than policy implementation. The initiation of roundtable operations, identification of 
external demands, and building of coalitions with relevant partners in a given policy 
field calls for openness and flexibility in the behavior of IOs. The use of elaborate 
procedural systems in the external boundaries of IOs would be detrimental to these 
innovation triggering efforts. Coming from this angle, it is rather in the outer margins 
of this type of organization where we may find evidence of organizational learning 
than in its core. It is the area where IOs attempt to arrive at consensual knowledge 
with external partners for the sake of policy development and planning. This is also 
the part of organizational life in IOs where boundary spanning activities are assumed 
to play a significant role by bringing together inputs from various sources inside and 
outside the organization. A shift in the underlying rules of the game would indicate a 
substantial change in the way an international bureaucracy acts towards its 
environment; i.e., a profound policy change or in terms of Argyris and Schön (1978) 
double-loop learning. They found that organizations have great difficulties to engage 
in this type of learning which involves the calling into question of norms, objectives, 
and basic policies.  
Based on these grounds it is assumed that international organizations learn from 
environmental actors for the attainment of consensual policies. But the attainment of 
consensual policies rests on bringing together what is feasible politically and 
administratively coupled with a solid knowledge base (expertise) regarding the issues 
to be addressed. It is in this sense that path dependencies become apparent. 
Established beliefs – internal or external to the organization – direct what types of 
societal problems need to be or should be addressed politically at the transnational 
level. And bureaucratic rigidities impact upon the ways that IOs incorporate policy-
relevant knowledge to tackle the defined issues. Whether the adopted programs 
indicate a profound or merely symbolic change may be questioned due to the 
significant restrictions in changing the accompanying procedures and rules 
necessary for implementing them. Hence, potential cross-fertilization and synergies 
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are expected to occur merely in IOs' boundaries with the effect of buffering the 
organizational core from external disturbances. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this article a theoretical framework is introduced to study how international 
organizations learn from their external partners in politics and society about changing 
conditions and developments in their environments. It follows the overarching 
principle that the social constitution of organizations matters for the mechanisms and 
underlying conditions of learning processes. Moreover, it rests on the claim that the 
organizational dynamics of international bureaucracies are more than simple mirrors 
of social forces in their political and institutional environments. In this sense, the 
integration of notions from neo-institutionalism with the overall OL perspective is seen 
as a necessary step to approach IOs as corporate actors capable of autonomous 
action. Based on these premises, Huber's (1991) model of organizational learning is 
used to explore IOs' interaction with outside partners as a triggering mechanism for 
organizational learning and its impact on subsequent processes of knowledge 
absorption and internalization. These interactions are captured with the term 
boundary spanning activities and understood as a means to acquire knowledge 
about changing conditions and developments in the environment. They refer to the 
rather intensive contacts of IOs' agents with actors in their environments that make 
them particularly well-suited to study this mode of organizational learning.  
However, not every interaction with people from the outside may be perceived by 
IOs' agents as a chance to learn and innovate. Ideas and perspectives might be in 
conflict to what is seen as politically desirable and/or feasible. Boundary spanning 
activities reflect the intertwined relation of ideas and interests in international affairs. 
IOs' interaction with representatives of their member states and constituencies is 
therefore a good example for studying the contested and controversial nature of 
knowledge absorption. Moreover, not every source of new knowledge makes its way 
through and across the organization's subunits due to barriers in its structure, culture 
and leadership. Administrative routines and procedures present severe limitations to 
an IO's absorptive capacity.  
Learning about environmental developments is more likely to occur in international 
organizations, 
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- if the boundary spanning activities are characterized by a problem-
solving/bridging mode of interaction; 
- if boundary spanners succeed in framing acquired knowledge within 
overarching political visions or consensual perspectives; 
- if boundary spanners have a stake in distributing the policy-relevant 
knowledge to a great variety of the organization's subunits; 
- if the organization's structure and culture allow for debate and discussion 
within and across its subunits; 
- if the organization's members engage in policy planning and development 
rather than in the implementation of its measures. 
A more specific account about the interrelations between these factors necessitates 
empirical research. The theoretical discussion about learning processes in 
international organizations reveals three issues that need further exploration. First, it 
should have become clear at this stage that the underlying conditions of boundary 
spanning activities are consequential for processes of knowledge acquisition and 
internalization. The critical question is whether these conditions enable the people 
involved in using discretion. There needs to be room for maneuver to engage in 
deliberation and to make decisions between alternative choices of action. Second, 
the contribution of boundary spanning activities seems to lead most likely to first-
order learning in IOs. This claim rests on the contention that the incorporation and 
building of new knowledge through boundary spanning activities tends to result in 
both: increased adaptability or innovativeness of policies and buffering the 
organizational core from environmental fluctuations. Hence, rather than assuming a 
trade-off between both effects, enhanced adaptability and buffering seem to 
necessitate each other. The final issue relates to the outcome of learning in IOs. 
Looking at private organizations one may expect improved competitiveness in 
uncertain technological and market circumstances. This is qualitatively different in 
governmental organizations. The incorporation and building of knowledge is 
assumed to enhance IOs' capability for political governance. 
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